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TOURO LAW REVIEW
districts.41 The court recognized that a state has a legitimate
interest in controlling education within its borders. 42 However,
the court of appeals also determined that the plaintiffs had a
cognizable cause of action under the Education Article of the
New York State Constitution for the state's failure of the state to
provide a "sound basic education."' 43 Thus, because the United
States Constitution does not contain a provision similar to the
Education Article of the New York State Constitution assuring
"maintenance and support of a system of free common schools,
wherein all the children of [the] state may be educated," 44 the
New York State Constitution provides more protection than the
Federal Constitution in the area of education.
Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v.
Cuomo 45
(decided June 15, 1995)
The plaintiffs, consisting of the not-for-profit organization
Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today [hereinafter
R.E.F.I.T.], sued on behalf of school districts, boards of
education, taxpayers, parents, and students enrolled in the public
schools, challenged the New York State method of public school
financing, claiming that it violated the Education Article of the
New York State Constitution, 46 and the Equal Protection Clauses
of the New York State47 and Federal 48 Constitutions.49 The
41. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
44. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
45. 86 N.Y.2d 279, 655 N.E.2d 647, 631 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1995).
46. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. Article XI, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
"The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of
free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated."
Id.
47. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article I, § 11 provides in pertinent part:
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court of appeals held that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights were
not violated because they failed to show that the students in the
"property-poor school districts" were not receiving their
constitutionally guaranteed "sound basic education." 50  In
addition, the court determined that the "desire to provide local
control of education" was a rational basis for upholding the state
financing scheme. 51
The gravamen of the complaint alleged that New York's
statutory school finance scheme5 2 results in an unconstitutional
difference in the amount spent per student in the property-rich
districts in relation to property-poor districts, and that "this
disparity demonstrates a gross and glaring inadequacy in the
State's school financing scheme." 53 Specifically, per-pupil
expenditures in the property-poor districts ranged from $7,107 in
the William Floyd district to $10,573, in the Islip school
district. 54 In comparison, expenditures in the property-rich
districts were as high as "$43,000 per pupil, with ten [districts]
over $20,000 and 39 over $10,000."55
Under the Cole-Rice Law,56 which provides the foundation for
the funding system that exists today, "each district is guaranteed
a minimum amount of State aid per pupil based on average daily
48. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states in
pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id.
49. R.E.F.LT., 86 N.Y.2d at 283, 655 N.E.2d at 648, 631 N.Y.S.2d at
552.
50. Id. at 284-85, 655 N.E.2d at 649, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
51. Id.
52. The school finance scheme, "based on property tax valuation"
distributes state aid in the amount of $8 billion to 700 school districts through
an "agglomeration of 51 different legislatively devised formulas." Reform
Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 152 Misc. 2d 714, 715, 578 N.Y.S.2d
969, 970 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1991), mod/fied, 199 A.D.2d 488, 606
N.Y.S.2d 44 (2d Dep't 1993), modfled, 86 N.Y.2d 279, 655 N.E.2d 647, 631
N.Y.S.2d 551 (1995).
53. R.E.F.LT., 86 N.Y.2d at 283-84, 655 N.E.2d at 648, 631 N.Y.S.2d
at 552.
54. R.E.F.LT., 152 Misc. 2d at 718, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
55. Id.
56. 1925 N.Y. Laws 675.
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attendance." 57 However, state aid provides less than 50 percent
of the money available to the schools to spend on education. 58
The remainder of the funds come from each district's "own
vastly disparate resources" 59 consisting of property taxes based
on the value of real property within each district. 60 Thus, even
though budget cuts in 1991 and 1992 reduced state aid to schools
by $460,000,000, wealthy districts were able to maintain their
level of educational services through "their richer tax base." 6 1 In
contrast, the budget cuts had a devastating effect on the sparse
programs that already existed in the poorer districts, and these
districts found it "impossible to replace the millions lost from the
State aid on which they rely." 62
However, despite the disparity in per pupil spending, the
plaintiffs did not plead that the students were not receiving a
"sound basic education" as the basis for their claim under the
Education Article of the New York State Constitution. 63 Instead,
they merely asserted that the spending scheme was
unconstitutional because the extreme disparity in funds each
57. R.E.F.LT., 152 Misc. 2d at 720, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
58. Id. at 718, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
59. Id. (quoting the defendant's answer).
60. Id. at 720, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
61. Id. at 721-22, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
62. Id. at 722, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 974. The tax rates in four of the plaintiff
districts, Middle Country, William Floyd, Brentwood, and Central Islip, are
among New York State's six highest tax rates. Id. at 719, 578 N.Y.S.2d at
972. In addition, at a valuation of $101.50 per $1,000, William Floyd, which
is the poorest district in Suffolk County, has "the highest wealth-adjusted [tax]
rate" in New York. Id. The impact of the disparate resources can be seen in
the William Floyd and Roosevelt districts. In William Floyd, "40% of its
9,500 students" are crowded into "rapidly deteriorating portable classrooms."
Id. In Roosevelt, the "pupil-teacher ratios [are] double those of other
districts." Id. Moreover, the property-poor districts have been compelled to
pay for state mandated programs such as asbestos removal "by cutting funds
from operating budgets reducing teaching and other staff, eliminating
educational programming, [and] making other sacrifices detrimental to their
educational mission." Id. at 720, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
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district had made the scheme inadequate. 64 The court of appeals,
in R.E.F.LT., relied on the reasoning of Levittown Union Free
School District v. Nyquist,65 and stated that the Education Article
does not require that "all educational facilities and services be
substantially equal throughout the State" but only requires that
the legislature "provide a State system of free schools availing all
of the State's children of a 'sound basic education.'" 66
In Levittown, the plaintiffs, including the boards of education
of property-poor school districts, alleged that the school finance
scheme of New York, based largely on property tax, was
unconstitutional because it resulted in "grossly disparate financial
support" which leads to "grossly disparate educational
opportunities." 67 As in R.E.F.LT., the court of appeals in
Levittown held that such disparities, attributable to "[t]he present
amalgam of statutory prescriptions for State aid to local school
districts... does not violate the equal protection clause of either
the Federal or the State Constitution nor is it unconstitutional
under the education article." 6 8
In evaluating the federal equal protection claim, the Levittown
court followed the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court
in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,69 where a similar
64. Id. at 283-84, 655 N.E.2d at 648, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
65. 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982).
66. R.E.F.LT., 86 N.Y.2d at 283, 655 N.E.2d at 648, 631 N.Y.S.2d at
552 (quoting Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 48, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
653).
67. Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 35-36, 439 N.E.2d at 361-62, 453 N.Y.S.2d
at 646.
68. Id. at 35, 439 N.E.2d at 361, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
69. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, the parents of minority school
children in San Antonio, Texas, instituted a class-action suit on behalf of all
poor and minority children throughout Texas, seeking to declare the Texas
school finance system unconstitutional. Id. at 5-6. The Court held that the
Texas school finance system, frnded through local property taxation, did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Id. In addition,
the Court did not depart from the "usual" rational basis standard "for
reviewing a State's social and economic legislation" stating that "[e]ducation,
of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our
Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so
protected." Id. at 35 (emphasis added). The New York Court of Appeals,
1996] 847
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claim was examined but disregarded. 70 The court of appeals
determined that under the rational basis standard, which was to
be applied in New York as it had been in Texas in Rodriguez,7 1
the current school finance scheme bore a rational relation to the
legitimate purpose of the state to "encourage[- ... participation
in and control of public schools at the local district level."' 72
however, could have distinguished Rodriguez in light of the fact that Article
XI, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution does afford explicit
protection for the right to education. Even without this explicit protection, the
reasoning employed by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez and the
New York Court of Appeals in Levittown is not aloof of skepticism. It has
been persuasively argued that implied fundamental rights under an equal
protection analysis are those rights which are necessary to the preservation of
all other rights and, as such, education is certainly a fundamental right. For
example, consider Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982):
Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the
Constitution. But neither is it merely some governmental "benefit"
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the
importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the
lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the
distinction .... We have recognized "the public schools as a most vital
civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of
government," and as the primary vehicle for transmitting "the values on
which our society rests." "As... pointed out early in our
history... some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to
participate effectively and intelligently in our political system if we are
to preserve freedom and independence." And these historic "perceptions
of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by
the observation of social scientists." In addition, education provides the
basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive
lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of our society.
Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
70. Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 40-41, 439 N.E.2d at 364, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
649.
71. Although the New York scheme was not reviewed in Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court recognized that "the Texas system is comparable to the systems
employed in virtually every other State." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 47-48
(footnote omitted).
72. Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 41, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 649
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Therefore, the court held that "disparities in per pupil
expenditures, resulting largely from differences in the value of
assessable property... coupled with a failure by the State to
offset such disparities" does not constitute a federal equal
protection violation. 73
Similarly, the Levittown court employed the rational basis
standard to review and dismiss the state equal protection claim. 74
Under the rational basis test, the court found the same reasonable
relation between the present school finance scheme and the state's
legitimate interest of "the preservation and promotion of local
control of education" as was found in the federal claim. 75 The
court reasoned that a system which allows "the taxpayers of
many districts to pay for and to provide enriched educational
services and facilities beyond what the basic per pupil
expenditure figures will permit" is justified under Rodriguez. 76
In addition, the court in Levittown dismissed the claim that the
finance scheme violates the Education Article of the New York
State Constitution because the constitutional language "makes no
reference to any requirement that the education to be made
available be equal or substantially equivalent in every district." 77
In addition, the court examined the other documentary proof
relating to the adoption of the Education Article in 1894 and
found nothing in it to support the conclusion that the legislature
intended "all educational facilities and services [to] be equal
throughout the State." 78 Moreover, the enactment of the
Education Article "mandated only that the Legislature provide
for maintenance and support of a system of free schools in order
that an education might be available to all the State's children." 79
Furthermore, the court declared that "the term
education... connote[s] a sound basic education," and that
requirement was met given that the "average per pupil
73. Id. at 40-41, 439 N.E.2d at 364, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 648-49.
74. Id. at 43, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
75. Id. at 44, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
76. Id. at 45, 439 N.E.2d at 367, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 47, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652. See supra note 47.
78. Id. at 47, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
79. Id. at 47-48, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
19961 849
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expenditure exceeds that in all other States but two." 80 The court
concluded its analysis of the education claim by stating that it
refused to overturn legislative funding decisions, but might
intervene if a "gross and glaring inadequacy" in the funding
system could be shown. 8 1
The New York Court of Appeals in R.E.F.L T., relying on the
analysis and reasoning in Levittown, did not find a "'gross and
glaring inadequacy"' and stated that an allegation of "extreme
disparity" was not sufficient to make out a valid claim under the
Education Article. 82 In addition, the court reviewed the history
of the Education Article and found that its purpose was "to
impose on [the Legislature] the absolute duty to provide a general
system of common schools" and not "to preclude disparities in
the funding for education."' 83 Therefore, because the New York
State Constitution only guarantees a "sound basic education" and
because the plaintiffs did not plead that the students were
receiving anything less than that, the court dismissed the
Education Article claim.84 Moreover, the court dismissed the
plaintiffs' state and federal equal protection claims because they
did not present any basis, either factual or legal, that would
convince the court to overrule Levittown and held that the "desire
to provide local control of education" provides a rational basis
for the current funding system. 85
80. Id. at 48, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 48-49, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
82. R.E.F.LT., 86 N.Y.2d at 284, 655 N.E.2d at 648, 631 N.Y.S.2d at
552 (citation omitted).
83. Id. (quoting 3 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF NEw YORK 554 (1994)). See also Judd v. Board of Educ. of Union Free
Sch. Dist. No. 2, 278 N.Y. 200, 207, 15 N.E.2d 576, 580 (1938) (stating that
in adopting the state common school system of education, the "cost of
construction... and the funds necessary for their maintenance and in aid of
education therein are provided by taxation by the localities in which the schools
are located and by the State out of ... public funds") (emphasis added),
overruled on other grounds, Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228
N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1967), aft'd, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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In conclusion, in order for a plaintiff to succesfully challenge
New York's school financing scheme under either the Federal or
New York State Equal Protection Clauses, a level of scrutiny
higher than rational basis must be adopted by the court. 86 In
order to successfully challenge the financing scheme under the
Education Article, a plaintiff must show "a gross and glaring
inadequacy" in the funding of education which can be evidenced
by a factual argument that the children are receiving less than a
"sound basic education." 87 Absent such a showing, the New
York State school funding system will not be deemed
unconstitutional. 88
86. Id.
87. Id. at 284, 655 N.E.2d at 648, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
88. Id. at 285, 655 N.E.2d at 649, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 553. In holding that
the finance scheme was not unconstitutional, the court modified the "broad and
definitive declaration" of the appellate division which held that the system was
constitutional. Id. See Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 199
A.D.2d 488, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 (2d Dep't 1993), modified, 86 N.Y.2d 279, 655
N.E.2d 647, 631 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1995). In addition, two other cases which
sought to declare the New York State school financing system unconstitutional
were decided on that same day as R.E.F.LT. See City of New York v. State of
New York, 86 N.Y.2d 286, 289, 295, 655 N.E.2d 649, 650, 654, 631
N.Y.S.2d 553, 554, 558 (1995) (dismissing the complaint because the
municipal plaintiffs, including New York City, its Board of Education, the
Mayor, and the Chancellor, lacked the legal capacity to sue the state);
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 319,
655 N.E.2d 661, 667, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565, 571 (1995) (holding that the
plaintiffs' claim under the Education Article, based on the failure to provide a
sound basic education to the children in New York City school districts, stated
a cognizable cause of action at the pleading stage).
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